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Proportional Representation by Race: The Constitutionality of 
Benign Racial Redistricting 
Courts generally recognize the highly political nature of legislative 
apportionment schemes and thus allow legislatures a great deal of 
leeway in drawing electoral districts.1 In two categories of cases, 
however, the courts have demonstrated a greater readiness to question 
the constitutionality of apportionment plans. First, they have up-
held challenges to the validity of voting districts that deviate signifi-
cantly from the "one person, one vote" standard2 and, second, they 
have carefully examined claims that a districting plan was formulated 
along racial lines.3 Within this second category, particularly complex 
questions arise when state legislatures establish districts along racial 
lines in order to increase the political power of minority groups that 
have been subjected to racial discrimination. 
The issue of "benign" or "corrective" racial redistricting recently 
came before the Second Circuit in United Jewish Organizations of 
Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Wilson.4 In Wilson, plaintiff challenged a 
redistricting scheme6 that was designed to give Kings County, New 
York, approximately proportional representation6 by race in the state 
legislature. Plaintiff represented members of a White community7 
1. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964); Gaff.ney v. Cummings, 
412 U.S. 735 (1973). In Gaffney, the Court refused to strike down a reapportion-
ment plan that attempted to achieve a rough approximation of the statewide political 
strength of the two major political parties in the state legislature. The Court ob-
served that "we have not ventured far or attempted the impossible task of extirpating 
politics from what are the essentially political processes of the soverelgn states." 412 
U.S. at 754. 
2. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 
U.S. 1 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963). 
3. See, e.g., Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 
364 U.S. 339 (1960). Since the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-
1973p (1970), the federal courts have been forced to take a more active part in these 
decisions. 
4. 510 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1975) 
(No. 75-104). 
5. The challenged scheme was developed after an earlier plan had failed to re-
ceive the approval of the United States Attorney General as required under section 
5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973c (1970). 510 F.2d at 515-
16. The case here, however, arose not as the result of proceedings under the Act, 
but instead as an independent suit relying on constitutional objections to the proposed 
scheme. 510 F.2d at 519-20. 
6. "Proportional representation" is used here to describe an apportionment 
scheme designed to permit racial groups to control election results in a number of 
districts roughly proportional to their population. Such a scheme is intended to pro-
duce a legislative body proportioned according to race. 
7. The plaintiff filed suit on behalf of the members of the Hasidic community 
in the Williamsburgh section of Brooklyn, New York. 510 F.2d at 514. However, 
the court, explaining that a community has no right to recognition as a community 
and therefore has no claim to being left intact within one district, denied the plain-
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that, under the redistricting scheme, was equally divided between two 
districts so that each district would contain a controlling non-White 
majority. 8 Plaintiff alleged that such a division diluted its voting 
power on the basis of race in violation of .the fifteenth amendment. 
Furthermore, it claimed that the use of racial criteria to create invid-
ious restrictions against its members as White voters violated the 
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the plain-
tiffs had suffered no cognizable injury and that "racial considera-
tions" had been permissibly employed "to correct a wrong. "9 On 
appeal, the Second Circuit found that the plan would not unconstitu-
tionally dilute the voting strength of White voters in Kings County 
because, even if the districts with non-White majorities elected non-:-
White representatives, "there would be no disproportionately non-
White representation in either house" of the state legislature.10 Fur-
thermore, the court held that employment of a proportional repre-
sentation s~heme was permissible to correct the effects of discrimina-
tiqn _ _i;1gainst non-Whites that had diluted non-White representation in 
Kings County.11 
tiff standing as a representative of Hasidic voters. 510 F.2d at 520-22. The court 
instead granted standing to the members of the group as White voters complaining 
of a denial of equal protection and an abridgment of their right to vote on account 
of race or color. 510 F.2d at 521-22. For the purposes of this Note, only the claim 
as White voters is significant. 
8. The challenged redistricting plan contained seven assembly and three senate 
districts with non-White majorities of at least 65 per cent. The use of ·this figure 
seems to have been based on the premise that, given rates of voter registration and 
turnout, anything less would render uncertain the power of the non-White majority 
to control election results in those districts. 510 F.2d at 526 (Frankel, J., dissent-
ing). The plaintiff community's members were divided between two senate and two 
assembly districts, all of which thereby had controlling non-White majorities. 510 
F.2d at 523 n.21. 
9. 377 F. Supp. 1164, 1166 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). 
10. 510 F.2d at 523. The Court explained that the population of Kings County 
was 64.9 per cent White, 24.7 per cent Black, and 10.4 per cent Puerto Rican. Under 
the original plan, only 1 of the 10 senate districts contained a "sulistantial" non-
White majority of 65 per cent, while under the revised plan, 3 of the 10 contained 
such majorities. The court felt that this percentage of the districts compared favor-
ably to the 35.1 per cent total non-White population in the county. Out of 22 assem-
bly districts, 7 had more than 50 per cent non-White population under the original 
plan, while under the revised plan 5 districts had 75 per cent non-Whites and 2 had 
65 per cent non-White majorities. 510 F.2d at 523 n.21. 
11. Specifically, the court explained that under the originally proposed districting 
plan, New York had "dilut[ed] nonwhite representation through the use of unlawful 
devices in and prior to 1968," and caused the "underrepresentation of race." 510 
F.2d at 525. 
Judge Frankel dissented on the ground that proportional representation by race 
was an unconstitutional objective, and pointed out that the scheme had been sup-
ported by neither a rational basis nor a compelling need rationale. He argued further 
that the state legislature had not found the racial quota of 65 per cent either neces-
sary or appropriate to correct a wrong, and that the legislature only developed this 
particular plan to satisfy the Attorney General. 510 F.2d at 529. 
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Wilson raises two questions that are basic to the use of "benign" 
racial classifications in drawing legislative districts. First, is there a 
constitutional right to proportional representation and, second, if 
there is no such right, are there circumstances under which a scheme 
devised to provide proportional representation is constitutionally per-
missible. This Note will demonstrate that, while the Supreme Court 
recognizes the constitutional right of each individual to participate on 
an equal basis in the community's political process and to enjoy an 
undiluted vote, it denies any constitutional right of groups to propor-
tional political repr.esentation. It will then show that the use of racial 
criteria in any context, including redistricting to ensure representa-
tion, triggers strict judicial scrutiny of constitutionality that can only 
be satisfied if the racial classification is necessary to further a com-
pelling state interest. Although decisions in the areas of school 
segregation and employment discrimination indicate that courts gen-
erally recognize such an interest in remedying the effects of past 
discrimination against a racial minority, the Note will suggest that the 
courts must scrutinize any proposed remedy in light of the availability 
of "less drastic" means to advance that interest and the extent of 
adverse impact that may be caused by the benign racial classification. 
The Note will argue that such an approach is particularly crucial in 
the context of redistricting, because proportional representation is an 
uncertain remedy for dilution of minority group voting power and 
because there are demonstrable adverse effects on nonminority 
groups. It concludes that, under a strict scrutiny analysis, the use of 
a benign racial classification to advance proportional representation is 
not a constitutionally permissible remedy for the effects of prior 
dilution of minority voting power. 
In order to determine whether proportional representation is con-
stitutionally mandated, it is first necessary to define the nature of the 
rights involved. The right to vote in state and federal elections is 
secured by the Constitution.12 The fifteenth amendment explicitly 
proscribes its denial or abridgment "by the United States or by an 
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." 
aearly, racial gerrymandering that completely disenfranchises some 
citizens on the basis of their race is unconstitutional.13 In addition, 
the Supreme Court has recognized that "the right of suffrage can be 
denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote 
just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the 
franchise."14 Thus, the Court has developed the principle of "one 
person, one vote," which requires a substantial equality of population 
between legislative districts, to assure that every vote carries equal 
12. See Reynolds v. Sims, 3.77 U.S. 533, 554 (1964). 
13. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
14. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). 
March 1976] Proportional Representation by Race 823 
weight.15 To ensure further the integrity of the individual's ballot, 
the Court has also recognized that the equal protection clause secures 
the individual's right to participate on an equal basis in the political 
life of his community.16 This right to "full and effective participa-
tionm7 may be abridged when the political processes leading to the 
nomination and election of candidates are not fully open to members 
of a particular group.18 Specifically, impermissible dilution can 
occur through reapportionment if a redistricting scheme purposefully 
renders the support of a particular group of voters unnecessary to a 
successful campaign and thereby enables candidates to ignore their 
interests and needs.19 
Thus, in scrutinizing claims that a redistricting scheme dilutes the 
franchise, the Supreme Court has demonstrated that it considers the 
right to vote essential to the continued vitality of a democratic society, 
for "[o]ther rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to 
vote is undermined."20 However, the Court has been careful to 
distinguish between the constitutionally protected right of individuals 
to vote and the unsupported claim of groups to representation. 21 
Thus, it has stressed that "the rights sought to be vindicated in a 
suit challenging an apportionment scheme are 'personal and 
individual.' "22 The notion that a particular interest group is entitled 
to representation was firmly laid to rest in Whitcomb v. Chavis.23 
Although the Court acknowledged the right of the legislative district 
to have a representative, it explicitly rejected the claim of Black 
ghetto-dwellers that they (or any other groups within the district) 
were constitutionally entitled to have their interests represented. 24 If, 
as was held in Whitcomb, there is no constitutional right to represen-
tation per se, then it follows that there can be no right to proportional 
15. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 
1 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963). 
16. See Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 
U.S. 526 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 
U.S. 368 (1962). 
17. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964). 
18. See Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965). 
19. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973 ). Cf. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 
124 (1971). 
20. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1964 ). 
21. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964). 
22. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 n.39 (1964), quoting South v. Peters, 
399 U.S. 276,280 (1950) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
23. 403 U.S. 124 (1971). See Beer v. United States, 44 U.S.L.W. 4435, 4437 
n.8 (U.S. March 30, 1976). For discussions of the existence of a right to :,:epresen-
tation, see Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote--One 
Vote, One Value, 1964 SUP. Cr. REV. 1, 46; Irwin, Representation and Election: 
The Reapportionment Cases in Retrospect, 61 MICH. L. REV. 729 (1969); Note, 
Minority Representation, SO N.C. L. REv. 104 (1971). But see Note, Compensatory 
Racial Reapportionment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 84 (1972). 
24. For a discussion of this holding, see Taylor v. McKeithen, 499 F.2d 893, 905-
06 (5th Cir. 1974). 
824 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:820 
representation. Indeed, in Kilgarlin v. Hill,25 the Court rejected a 
claim that a redistricting plan was unconstitutional because it failed to 
provide for minority control in a number of districts roughly propor-
tional to the minority population. The Court explained that the 
Constitution neither mandates the election of a member of a particu-
lar interest group nor establishes a right to representation by a person 
of the same race. 26 
Although there is no constitutional right to proportional represen-
tation, the fourteenth. amendment does guarantee every person the 
right to have access to the political processes of the community. Thus, 
the Court has found that, in the context of reapportionment, a 
constitutional infirmity arises not when there is a disparity between 
a minority group's percentage of elected representatives and its per-
centage of total electors, but when a redistricting scheme is pur-
posefully designed to render the support of minority group mem-
bers unnecessary to a candidate's campaign and thereby dilutes 
the minority vote. 27 Two rec.ent Supreme Court cases illustrate 
25. 386 U.S. 120 (1967), affg. per curiam, 252 F. Supp. 404 (S.D. Tex. 1966). 
26. In numerous reapportionment cases, the courts have refused to require legisln-
tures to consider common interests in the formulation of voting districts. See, e.g., 
Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969); Ferrell v. Oklahoma ex rel. Hall, 339 F. 
Supp. 73 (W.D. Okla.), aftd., 406 U.S. 939 (1972); Gilbert v. Sterret, 509 F.2d 1389, 
1391 (5th Cir. 1975) (redistricting plan not invalid "merely because its lines [were] 
not carefully drawn to ensure representation to sizeable racial, ethnic, economic, or 
religious groups"); Howard v. Adams County Bd. of Supervisors, 453 F.2d 455 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972) (Black community not entitled to "two pre-
dominantly Black electoral districts simply because they command a population con-
centration of sufficient size and contiguity to constitute two equally apportioned dis• 
tricts"); Ince v. Rockefeller, 290 F. Supp. 878, 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (neither the 
concept of one person, one vote nor the provisions of the fourteenth or fifteenth 
amendments guarantee to any racial or national group the right to representation ac• 
cording to color). See also Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973), 
aftd. sub nom. East Carroll Parish School v. Marshall, 44 U.S.L.W. 4320 (U.S. 
March 8, 1976); Cousins v. City of Chicago, 503 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1974); Taylor 
v. McKeithen, 499 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1974); Mann v. Davis, 245 F. Supp. 241 (:E.D. 
Va.), aftd., 382 U.S. 42 (1965). The Supreme Court has similarly rejected 
claims for proportional representation on grand or petit juries. See Swain v. Ala-
bama, 380 U.S. 202, 211 (1965) ("[N]either the jury roll nor the venire need be a 
perfect mirror of the community or accurately reflect the proportionate strength of 
every identifiable group [because] proportional representation is not permissible"); 
Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945). 
27. Dilution questions typically arise in cases challenging the creation or continu-
ation of multimember districts, where a large segment of the population, but less than 
a majority, consists of minority residents. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 
(1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 
73 (1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965). However, votes of an ethnic 
or other interest group may be diluted through the use of single member districts as 
well. An area of heavily concentrated minority population may be "cracked" into 
several pieces, each of which is added to a district with a larger white majority, thus 
creating new districts, all with white majorities. The Supreme Court has never ex-
plicitly held this technique unconstitutional, but it has implied that the formulation 
of "cracked" districts after a long history of bias and franchise dilution in drawing 
apportionment plans may be unconstitutional. See Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 
1!}1, 194 n.3 (1972). 
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the phenomenon of impermissible "dilution." In White v. 
Regester, 28 the Court, in considering a challenge to an apportionment 
scheme that included multimember districts, concluded that nomina-
tion and election procedures and a history of overt discrimination 
against Blacks in local politics29 combined effectively to exclude 
Blacks from participation in the election process. The Court noted 
that Black support was unnecessary to a successful campaign and that 
local politicians relied on racist tactics to defeat candidates supported 
by the Black community.30 In contrast, in Whitcomb v. Chavis,31 the 
Supreme Court overturn¢ a finding of unlawful dilution where there 
was no evidence of discrimination against Blacks in local politics and 
where it was shown that Black support was actually crucial to the 
succ.ess of Democratic candidates. Further, the Court refused to 
accept a finding of dilution simply because ghetto residents lacked a 
voice to e~press their policy view: "[T]he failure of the ghetto to 
have legislative seats in proportion to its population emerges more as 
a function of losing elections than of built-in bias against poor 
Negroes."32 
These two opinions clearly indicate that the Constitution pros-
cribes interference with the right of minority voters to exert influence 
The minority population may also be "packed" into a single district and thereby 
influence elections in only one district, even when, if the population were distributed, 
it could be large . enough to affect the vote in several districts. The plaintiffs in 
Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), attacked the plan adopted by the New 
York legislature on these grounds, but the Court found no proof that the districts 
bad been created along racial lines or that the legislature acted upon racial motiva-
tions. 
In a "stacked" district, minority voting strength is diluted by combining concen-
trations of minority voters in an irregularly shaped district with greater concentration 
of Whites to create over-all White majorities. Although the courts have not held 
"stacked" districts unconstitutional per se, a "stacked" reapportionment plan pre-
sumably will not withstand constitutional attack if racial intent or invidious discrim-
ination is proved. See Sims v. Baggett, 247 F. Supp. 96 (M.D. Ala. 1965); WMCA 
v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y.), affd., 382 U.S. 4 (1965), vacated, 384 
U.S. 887 (1966). For a more complete discussion of gerrymandering techniques 
generally, see Tayler, Court Versus Legislature: The Sociopolitics of Malapportion-
ment, 27 LAw & CONTEMP. PR.on. 390, 400 (1962). For such a discussion in a 
racial context, see Parker, County Redistricting in Mississippi: Case Studies in Racial 
Gerrymandering, 44 Miss. L.J. 391, 402-03 (1973). 
28. 412 U.S. 155 (1973). 
29. Several devices were then being used in Texas to stifle Black participation in 
politics: (1) a majority, rather than a plurality, vote was a prerequisite to nomina-
tion in primary elections; (2) a "place'' rule was enforced that limited candidacy 
from a multimember district to a specific place on the ballot and thereby rendered 
the election for each position a bead-to-bead contest, thus accentuating racial differ-
ences when they arose; (3) at-large candidates were not required to reside in any 
particular geographic subdivisions, and thus all the district representatives tended to 
come from the same area. Moreover, the Court noted that only two Blacks had ever 
served on the delegation representing the county in question, despite a large Black 
population. See 412 U.S. at 766-67. 
30. See 412 U.S. at 767. 
31. 403 U.S. 124 (1971). 
32. 403 U.S. at 124. 
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in the political arena, but does not establish an affirmative right to 
elect a candidate of a particular race or viewpoint: "[A]ccess to the 
political process and not population [is] the barometer of dilution of 
minority voting strength."33 Thus, when a. redistricting plan renders 
the support of minority voters unnecessary to a successful campaign, 
thereby depriving them of a meaningful role in the election process, 
dilution has clearly occurred. Although underrepresentation may 
provide evidence that dilution has occurred, it is important to distin-
guish between the two concepts. Dilution occurs when an individual 
is deprived of his constitutional right of access to the political 
process, while representation refers to the claim (which has never 
been recognized as a constitutional right) that an individual is enti-
tled to a voice in the legislature to further his particular interests. The 
lower courts, however, have not always recognized the important 
distinction between these two concepts. For example, in Wilson the 
court simply misinterpreted the dilution cases when it found that the 
"dilution of non-White representation through the use of unlawful 
devices"34 was unconstitutional. Because the Constitution provides a 
right to access, and not to representation, the inability of a racial 
minority to obtain legislative seats in proportion to its population 
cannot, in itself, constitute a constitutional violation. 
The distinction between the right to "representation" and the 
right to "access" also helps to clarify the role the Court has played in 
the reapportionment area. The Supreme Court's refusal to recognize 
a right to representation not only indicates an awareness of the limits 
of the constitutional right to vote, but also serves to deter the judiciary 
from intruding too deeply into what has aptly been described as the 
"substance of the political process."35 If the courts attempt to ensure 
the accommodation of particular interests in the legislature, they will 
be forced to resolve value-laden political questions, such as which 
groups deserve representation, the number of representatives that 
should be allocated to each group, and the particular interest category 
into which each individual must be placed.36 Clearly, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that, were it to guarantee representation to one 
racial group, then .members of all political, religious, social, and 
ethnic groups might legitimately demand similar treatment. 87 More-
over, representation is essentially a political problem simply because 
representatives are chosen, and the character of the legislature is 
33. Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1303 (5th Cir. 1973 ), afld. on other 
grounds sub nom. East Carroll Parish School v. Marshall, 44 U.S.L.W. (U.S. March 
8, 1976). 
34. 510 F.2d at 525 (emphasis added). 
35. Irwin, supra note 23, at 748. 
36. Id. at 753. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting); Auerbach, supra note 23 at 36-3&; Note, 50 N.C. L. RBv. 104, supra note 
23, at 110. 
37. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 156-57 (1971). 
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1:hereby determined, in ,an electoral contest: "[a]s our system has it, 
one candidate wins, the others lose."38 To guarantee a right of 
representation, the judiciary would have to involve itself directly 
in the election process and dictate the outcome of the contest. 
Thus, the Court has recognized that "the apportionment task, deal-
ing as it must with fundamental 'choices about the nature of represen-
tation' .•. is primarily a political and legislative process."39 
By acknowledging the right of access, however, the Court does 
not force the judiciary to influence the outcome of political elections. 
Rather, where a claim of dilution is made, the courts need only assess 
the ability of minority voters to participate on an equal basis with 
other citizens in the community's political processes. If minority 
interests are not ignored and minority voters participate freely in a 
nondiscriminatory candidate selection process, then the judi(?ial task is 
finished; the inability of minority candidates to win is of no concern 
to the courts, except in so far as persistent electoral failures might 
indicate interference with the right of voters to access.40 In distin-
guishing between access and representation, the Court has thus con-
cluded that, in a democratic society, while every citizen has a right to 
participate in the process of nominating and selecting representatives 
of the people, no individual (or group) has a constitutionally pro-
tected right to a personal lobbyist in the legislature. 
The question that next arises is whether proportional representa-
tion, if not constitutionally required, is constitutionally permissible. 
Specifically, where the right of members of a minority group to 
participate in the political process has been diminished because of a 
history of discrimination, may a court or legislature attempt to 
alleviate the effects of such prior discrimination by establishing a 
racial districting scheme designed to provide proportional representa-
tion? 
Under modem constitutional analysis, although racial classifica-
tions are not unconstitutional per se, 41 they are generally considered 
inherently suspect and thus subject to strict judicial scrutiny.42 This 
means that, if the government wishes to use a racially based classifica-
tion, it must demonstrate that the use of this classification is necessary 
to further a compelling state interest and that its use is the least 
38. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971). 
39. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 749 (1973), quoting Burns v. Richard-
son, 384 U.S. 73, 92 (1966). 
40. If, for example, Black candidates have been slated, but have always lost, this 
may indicate that they have been granted merely token participation. See generally 
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149-53 (1971). 
41. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 19 
(1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254, 
1257 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971). 
42. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). For a thorough dis-
cussion of the equal protection analysis, see Developments in the Law-Equal Protec-
tion, 82 HARv. L RBv. 1065 (1969). 
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drastic means of accomplishing the desired end. 43 In the past, cases 
dealing with racial discrimination have generally involved discrimina-
tion against racial minorities; it is only recently that the courts have 
decided cases of "reverse" discrimination. The Supreme Court has 
not yet determined whether, and under what circumstances, "benign" 
classifications may be utilized. 44 The Court's failure to resolve the 
issue is reflected in disagreements among the lower courts and ac-
counts for the absence of uniform principles or policies in this area. 45 
The uncertainty and confusion felt by the courts in reverse dis-
crimination cases make it extremely difficult to discern the standards 
of scrutiny they are applying to such racial classifications. Despite 
the lack of a uniform approach, general trends can be gleaned from 
the courts' decisions and applied to the specific problems raised when 
proportional representation is used as a remedy for dilution of minor-
ity votes. It should be made clear at the outset that the trends are a 
composite generalization of determinations made by courts that often 
fail to articulate clearly the precise analysis they themselves are using. 
Nevertheless, it is submitted that the behavior of the courts taken as a 
whole is indicative of a viable approach to the benign classification 
problem-an approach the courts would do well to make more 
explicit. 
It appears that the courts are applying a strict scrutiny test to the 
use of benign classifications, not one that invokes a mechanical 
finding of invalidity of such classifications, but a test that attempts to 
balance the state's compelling interest in framing effective remedies 
(both judicial and legislative) to combat the evils of race discrimina-
tion against the harm caused to nonminority group members because 
of the use of racial criteria.46 Specifically the factors that weigh in 
this balance appe~ to be the extent of the invidious racial discrimina-
tion, the state's interest in eliminating the effects of such discrimina-
43. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971); Loving v. Vir• 
ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The same analysis is applied in cases involving restric-
tions upon fundamental interests, such as voting. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. 
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
44. The Court avoided consideration of this issue in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 
U.S. 312 (1974), a case involving preferential admissions to law school, when it held 
that the issue was moot because the plaintiff had been attending classes and would 
be allowed to graduate. 
45. See Edwards & Zaretsky, Preferential Remedies for Employment Discrimina-
tion, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12 (1975) ("[O]pinions have often become mired in tradi-
tional constitutional jargon . . . and thus frequently obscure the truly difficult and 
significant issues raised by preferential remedies. As a consequence, no uniform 
legal principles or policy imperatives have emerged ..• "). 
46. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting), where Justice Marshall noted his disagreement with the 
view that "equal protection cases fall into one of two neat categories which dictate 
the appropriate standard of review-strict scrutiny or mere rationality." According 
to Justice Marshall, the Court has actually applied a "spectrum of standards" that 
"comprehends variations in the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize 
particular classifications .••• " 411 U.S. at 98-99. 
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tion, the efficacy of the proposed preferential remedy to achieve the 
end sought, the possibility of furthering -this interest through the use 
of neutral remedies, and the adverse impact the preferential remedy 
will have on nonminority group members. 
The balancing approach within a strict scrutiny framework 
can be tested by exaroinine four situations involving racial 
classifications: de jure and de facto segregation of schools, prefer-
ential employment, and "fictional" seniority. .Although the courts in 
those varying situations have not weighed the factors uniformly or 
consistently, and have occasionally even disregarded some entirely, 
two tendencies will be apparent. First, the courts are more willing to 
find a compelling state interest and less strict in requiring a showing 
that no less drastic alternatives exist when the purpose of a racial 
classification is to remedy the effects of past state-promoted discrimi-
nation against a racial minority. Second, the courts appear to be less 
willing to allow benign racial classifications to be used when they will 
impose a significant adverse impact upon the nonmin<;>rity group. 
Voluntary action by a school board to integrate the schools within 
its jurisdiction has survived constitutional attack on several occa-
sions. 47 The simplest cases have involved desegregating school sys-
tems in which overt discrimination by state officials has resulted in 
"dual" systems. In such cases the courts have held that the Constitu-
tion clearly permits efforts to eliminate segregation, even if such 
efforts require the use of racial classifications. 48 Thus, the Court has 
pointed out that school boards operating dual school systems are 
"charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be 
necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination 
would be eliminated root and branch. "49 The s_tate violates the equal 
protection clause when it discriminates on the basis of race in its 
schools, and continues to violate the Constitution until the segregated 
system is eliminated. 50 It makes no difference whether the school 
board voluntarily dismantles the segregated system or whether a 
termination order issues from a court;51 in either case, the use of 
racial criteria is permissible when necessary to ensure desegregation. 52 
41. See, e.g., Offerman v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1967); Tometz v. 
Board of Educ., 39 Ill. 2d 593,237 N.E.2d 498 (1968). 
48. See McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971); Springfield School Comm. v. 
Barksdale, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965). 
49. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968). 
50. See Wanner v. County School Bd. of Arlington, 357 F.2d 452 (4th Cir. 1966); 
Springfield School Comm. v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965). 
51. Compare Wanner v. County School Bd. of Arlington, 357 F.2d 452 ( 4th Cir. 
1966), with Springfield School Comm. v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965). 
See also McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971). 
52. It is clear from the exasperation of the Court with the foot-dragging behavior 
of many school boards following the decision in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 
483 (1954), that alternatives were not feasible. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. County School ,Bel., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
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As one commentator has put it, "In the school desegregation cases, 
both the compelling governmental interest in integration and the 
absence of workable, less drastic means are well documented, making 
it easy for the Supreme Court to apply strict scrutiny to desegregation 
orders and yet allow the lower courts a great deal of discretion."113 
The de jure segregation cases, moreover, represent perhaps the clear-
est situation in which -the need to use a benign racial classification 
outweighs the adverse impact upon the nonminority group: The 
impact of benign classification upon nonminority students is slight 
because no one has a right to a segregated education. 54 
In the absence of de jure segregation, the courts will not require, 
but will permit, state action to eliminate de facto racial imbalances by 
the use of racial criteria. 55 For example, in Springfield School 
Committee v. Barksdale,56 the First Circuit approved a school board 
plan that utilized racial criteria to correct a racial imbalance. The 
court implied that the state's interest in providing its school children 
with an education free from th~ taint of racial prejudice was suffi-
ciently compelling to meet the strict scrutiny test: "The . . . pro-
posed action does not concern race except insofar as race correlates 
with proven deprivation of educational opportunity. This evil satis-
. fies whatever 'heavier burden of justification' there may be."117 A 
number of the lower courts have quoted this language with approval 
and have reached the same result as the First Circuit in Barksdale.r,8 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has indicated, in dictum, that it 
would permit a school board to use racial criteria to correct a 
racial imbalance, even in the absence of a showing of de jure 
segregation: "School authorities are traditionally charged with 
broad power to formulate and implement educational policy and 
might well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students to 
live in a pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio 
of Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for the district as 
a whole. To do this as an educational policy is within the broad 
discretionary powers of school authorities."119 Thus, application of 
53. Edwards & Zaretsky, supra note 45, at 24. 
54. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 336 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
55. See Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. de-
nied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967). 
56. 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965). 
57. 348 F.2d at 266, quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 194 (1964). 
The district court appears to have found the compelling state interest test used in Mc-
Laughlin also applicable when benign discrimination is involved. 
58. See, e.g., Offermann v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1967); Porcelli v. 
Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971); Tometz v. 
Board of Educ., 39 Ill. 2d 593, 237 N.E.2d 498 (1968). Cf. Pride v. School Bd, 
of Brooklyn, 488 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1973) ( compelling state interest test not applica-
ble because the state action at issue had the objective and the effect of reducing segre-
gation and use of racial criteria therefore permissible). 
59. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). 
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the strict scrutiny, balancing approach in the de facto segregation 
cases leads to the conclusion that any slight adverse impact benign 
racial classifications might have upon nonminority children is out-
weighed by an important constitutional interest--ensuring access to 
educational opportunities without regard to race. 60 
The judicial analysis of preferential employment schemes61 has 
also involved balancing the need to employ racial criteria to achieve 
equality against the adverse impact such schemes have on nonminor-
ity group members. However, more than in other areas where strict 
scrutiny is applied to benign racial classifications, the results in 
preferential employment cases appear inconsistent and the courts 
have failed to explain why the balance has been struck in a particular 
direction. Although the courts frequently do not set out the basis for 
their decisions, those courts that have allowed the benign use of racial 
criteria in the employment context have obviously been persuaded 
that putting an end to racial discrimination in the labor sector is a 
compelling state interest that must be advanced by racial prefer-
ences62 because "neutral" ("less drastic") remedies have failed.63 
Those courts that have struck down or have refused to grant prefer-
ences based upon racial criteria have tended to focus on the adverse 
· impact such preferences have upon nonminority group members, and 
have obviously given less weight to the effects of prior discrimination 
against minorities. 64 
60. The reluctance of the courts to order the use of racial criteria in the absence 
of de jure segregation is perhaps indicative of the judgment that, in the absence of 
evidence of overt discrimination by the state, such sensitive policy issues are better 
left to a more politically responsive body. See generally Edwards & Zaretsky, supra 
note 45, at 24. Professor Edwards suggests that there is a "continuum in the level 
of scrutiny accorded a preferential remedy that depends on the degree of legisfative 
approval of that remedy." Id. Scrutiny is strictest when there is no legislative man-
date, and most lenient when there is an explicit legislative mandate. Thus,. the courts 
scrutinize legislative remedies more leniently than they do judicial preferential reme-
dies. 
61. In this context, "preferential employment schemes" refers to preferences in 
hiring and promotion and to the granting of fictional seniority. See generally Ed-
wards & Zaretsky, supra note 45; Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimi-
nation and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HAR.v. L REv. 1109 (1971). 
62. See, e.g., Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 
U.S. 944 (1971) (goal of equal opportunity so compelling that school board may not 
only be permitted but may be required to prefer Blacks in hiring); Associated Gen. 
Contractors of Mass. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1973 ), cert. denied, 
416 U.S. 957 (1974) (preferential hiring of Black workers in construction industry 
serves compelling state interest of providing equal employment opportunity and re-
ducing racial tension). 
63. See, e.g., NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1974) (preferen-
tial remedy essential to eliminate the effects of employment discrimination). But 
other courts have refused to approve preferential remedies because a "less drastic" 
alternative was thought to be available. See, e.g., Harper v. Mayor & City Council, 
359 F. Supp. 1187, 1214 (D. Md.), affd. sub nom. Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 
(4th Cir. 1973). 
64. See, e.g., Chance v. Board of Examiners, No. 75-7161 (2d Cir. Jan. 19, 
1976). 
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Typical of those cases that have upheld the use of preferential 
remedies is Associated General Contractors of Massachusetts v. Alt-
shuler, 65 in which a group of construction companies challenged an 
affirmative action plan promulgated by the governor of Massachu-
setts. Under this plan all state construction contracts were to include 
a clause obligating the general contractor to hire a certain percentage 
of minority workers. The First Circuit subjected the plan's use of 
racial criteria to strict scrutiny and held that because of the "com-
pelling need . . . to remedy serious racial imbalances in the construc-
tion trades,"66 the program did not violate the equal protection clause. 
The court reasoned that the long history of discrimination and the 
continuing racial imbalance in the construction industry compelled 
the conclusion that preferential remedies were essential to the achieve-
ment of equal employment opportunity. Furthermore, the court 
pointed out that the racial imbalance in the construction industry 
undermined efforts to achieve equal opportunity elsewhere in the 
economy and contributed to racjal tension.67 Similarly, in NAACP 
v. Allen, 68 the Fifth Circuit approved a plan that required a one-
Black-to-one-White hiring ratio to be in effect until twenty-five per 
cent of Alabama state troopers and support personnel were Black. 
The court strictly scrutinized the plan and found that the state's com-
pelling interest in ending unconstitutional racial discrimination justi-
fied a ",temporary, carefully circumscribed resort to racial criteria, 
whenever . . . it represents the only rational, non-arbitrary means 
of eradicating past evils."69 
Thus, the courts that have upheld the use of preferential remedies 
focus on the compelling need to afford relief that will be effective 
and, in their written opinions, often give little more than cursory 
attention ,to the adverse impact upon nonminority group members. 
One court that purported to deal with the problem simply quoted a 
government finding that preferential hiring goals could be met 
"'without adverse impact on the existing labor force.' "70 The fail-
ure of the courts to deal explicitly with the problem of adverse impact 
may mean either that there is no adverse impact71 or that a court has 
65. 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974). See Morrow 
v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974); Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 
622 (2d Cir. 1974); Southern Ill. Builders Assn. v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 
1972); Contractors Assn. of E. Penn. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971). 
66. 490 F.2d at 18. 
61. See 490 F.2d at 18. 
68. 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974). 
69. 493 F.2d at 619. 
70. Contractors Assn. v. Shultz, 442 F.2d 159, 173 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 
404 U.S. 854 (1971). 
71. A preferential hiring remedy would impose no adverse impact if, in the indus-
try involved, the demand for workers exceeded the supply, thus enabling the em-
ployer to hire minority workers while continuing to follow the same hiring practice 
with respect to other applicants. 
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struck the balance in favor of the need for preferential treatment. In 
all such cases, the courts should articulate the basis for their decisions 
in order to provide clear guidelines for lawful conduct. 
In those cases in which they refuse to allow the use of preferential 
remedies, the courts generally emphasize the adverse impact such 
remedies have on nonminority group members. For example, in the 
~ecent case of Kirkland v. New York State Department of Correc-
tional Services, 72 the Second Circuit uphel4 a finding by the trial court 
that a civil service examination unconstitutionally discriminated 
against Blacks and Hispanics, but reversed that part of the lower 
court's order that would have required employment of a racial quota. 
The court distinguished prior cases in which it had allowed the use of 
quotas: "In each of these cases, there was a clear-cut pattern of 
long-continued and egregious racial discrimination. In none of them 
was there a showing of identifiable reverse discrimination. In the 
instant case, there is insufficient proof of the former and substantial 
evidence of the latter."73 The court did seem to imply, however, that 
it might approve a benign racial quota in spite of the existence of an 
adverse impact, if a sufficiently compelling governmental interest was 
presented. 74 
The concern of the courts with the adverse impact of reverse 
discrimination was further illustrated in Chance v. Board of Examin-
ers75 where the Second Circuit examined the use of preferential racial 
quotas in the context of "fictional" seniority.76 ' Plaintiffs in Chance 
opposed New York City's use of a "last hired, first fired" plan for 
dismissing supervisory personnel, on the ground that the plan dis-
criminated against recently hired employees who had the least senior-
ity. The district court ordered the city to employ a quota system that 
would prevent a certain percentage of minority supervisors from 
being laid off. This meant, of course, that more senior White work-
ers would be laid off in place of less senior minority employees. 77 The 
Second Circuit reversed the district court's order, emphasizing the 
adverse impact such a quota would have on white employees: "To 
require a senior, experienced white member of such a group to stand 
72. 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975). 
73. 520 F.2d at 427. 
14. See 520 F.2d at 430. 
75. No. 75-7161 (2d Cir. Jaq. 19, 1976). 
76. "Fictional" seniority generally refers to upward adjustments of the seniority 
status of minority workers to a level theoretically equivalent to that which they would 
have had "but for" unlawful discrimination. It may also involve transforming depart-
mental seniority into plantwide seniority, giving credit for time actually worked, or 
simply increasing the seniority status of minority workers who would have been hired 
had the employer not discriminated, giving credit for time never actually worked. 
See Edwards & Zaretsky, supra note 45, at 41-46; Developments in the Law, supra 
note 61, at 1155-65 (1971); Note, Last Hired, First Fired Layoffs and Title VII, 
88 HARV. L. R.Bv. 1544 (1975). 
11. See No. 75-7161, at 6592. 
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aside and forego the seniority benefits guaranteed him . . . solely 
because a younger, less experienced member is Black or Puerto Rican 
is constitutionally forbidden reverse discrimination."78 Although the 
court did endorse "fictional" seniority as a remedy in cases in which 
discrimination against an identifiable minority group member had 
been proved, it distinguished that situation from general, group reme-
dial plans: "If a minority worker has been kept from his rightful 
place on the seniority list by his inability to pass a discriminatory 
examination, he may, in some instances, be entitled to preferential 
treatment-not because he is Black, but because, and only to the 
extent that, he has been discriminated ·against."79 The court's will-
ingness to allow a limited use of fictional seniority80 follows from its 
reasoning in Kirkland. It appears ready to restrict the use of prefer-
ential remedies to cases in which there has been a showing of overt 
discrimination and in which the adverse impact upon nonminority 
workers is slight. In fact, by allowing the circumscribed use of racial 
quotas in hiring cases (in which there has been a clear-cut showing 
of invidious racial discrimination and no showing of reverse discrim-
ination), but limiting the use of fictional seniority to cases where 
overt discrimination against an identifiable individual has been 
shown, the court is implying that the use of preferential remedies in 
the area of layoffs has a greater impact upon White workers and thus 
must be more carefully limited. 81 This distinction appears to have 
been adopted in other cases and approved by at least one commenta-
tor. 82 
78. No. 75-7161, at 6596 (footnote omitted). 
79. No. 75-7161, at 6596. This approach is consistent with that adopted in 
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 44 U.S.L.W. 4356, 4363-65 (U.S. March 24, 1976), 
where the Supreme Court construed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to al-
low seniority relief for identifiable victims of illegal hiring discrimination. No argu-
ments in favor of granting seniority to those not actually discriminated against, as 
required by the district court order in Chance, were made. 
80. The court explained that it will follow the "rightful place" doctrine to the ex-
tent of using plant seniority instead of departmental seniority, where departmental 
discrimination has prevented or delayed the transfer of minority workers into more 
favorable positions. Application of this doctrine will put minority workers in the ap-
proximate position on the seniority list that they would have occupied had they not 
been subjected to discriminatory treatment However, it does not involve the dis• 
placement of White workers, a result the court considered unacceptable, but only in• 
volves filling vacancies. See No. 75-7161, at 6596. See United States v. Bethlehem 
Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 661 (2d Cir. 1971); Papermakers Local 189 v. United 
States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). Cf. Franks 
v. Bowman Transp. Co., 44 U.S.L W. 4356, 4365 (U.S. March 24, 1976) (retroactive 
seniority did not deprive other employees of "indefeasibly vested rights"). 
81. The court distinguished the use of racial quotas in hiring from their use in 
adjusting seniority status and indicated that because the seniority preference would 
impose a much greater impact on White workers, the cases approving preferential hir• 
ing quotas do not support the institution of preferential grants of seniority. No. 75-
7161, at 6595-96. 
82. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 44 U.S.L.W. 4356 (U.S. March 24, 
1976), revg. 495 F.2d 398, 417-18; Edwards & Zaretsky, supra note 45, at 6595-96. 
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Although the school and employment cases that have been exam-
ined are only a small sampling of the burgeoning case law on the use 
of benign classifications, the strict scrutiny analysis adopted in these 
cases is representative of the general approach of the courts. 83 The 
cases examined here can be seen as lying along a spectrum ranging 
from situations in which the use of racial criteria is clearly permissi-
ble, to situations in which the balancing of factors becomes much 
more difficult and might result in the proscription of racial classifica-
tions. At one end of the spectrum are the de jure segregation 
cases, in which the evidence of both overt discrimination and the 
failure of neutral remedies is clear and convincing, while the adverse 
impact is negligible. Emphasizing the importance of society's inter-
est in desegregation, the courts have not hesitated to order or uphold 
See also Acha v. Beame, No. 75-7388 (2d Cir. Feb. 19, 1976) (involving sex discrim-
ination); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civ. Serv. Comm.n., 482 F.2d 
1333, 1341 (2d Cir. 1973) ("[W]hile this factor will delay those of the minority 
groups who will become patrolmen, the imposition of quotas will obviously discrimi-
nate against those Whites who pave embarked upon a police career with the expecta-
tion of advancement only to be now thwarted because of color alone. The impact 
of the quota upon these men would be harsh and can only exacerbate rather than 
diminish racial attitudes"); Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 
995 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970) ("[l]t is one thing for legis-
lation to require the creation of fictional seniority for newly hired Negroes, and quite 
another thing for it to require that time actually worked in Negro jobs be given equal 
status with time worked in white jobs" (emphasis original)). 
83. In Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 
1973), the court held that the compelling state interest test was the appropriate stand-
ard by which to scrutinize an arguably benign racial quota established by the state 
housing authority. In order to avoid the phenomenon of "White flight," which com-
monly occurs when the Black population in an area reaches a certain level, the au-
thority established a quota for minority occupancy at a particular housing project and 
denied admission to non-White families once the quota was filled. The authority 
contended that failure to use such .a quota would have led to a high concentration 
of Blacks, the departure of the remaining Whites, and the creation of a "pocket 
ghetto." The court agreed with the housing authority and permitted the use of racial 
quotas, provided that the authority sustained a "heavy burden of proof' that such ac-
tion was necessary to avoid segregation. 
In Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 975 (1967), 
the Fifth Circuit upheld the purposeful inclusion of two Black citizens on a grand 
jury venire list, despite the settled constitutional principle that jury selection pro-
cedures may not discriminate on the basis of race. Since discrimination against 
Blacks could easily have been proved through statistical evidence of the historical 
lack of Black jurors, the state's strong interest in preventing overturned convictions 
justified the use of racial criteria. However, the court stated that such criteria could 
never be used to obtain jury panels that were proportioned according to race, since 
jurors should be selected as individuals, on the basis of their individual qualifications, 
and not as members of a particular race. Moreover, the court observed that a selec-
tion process aimed at a proportional balance places an artificial and unacceptable 
limit on participation. 
In DeFunis v. Odegaard, 507 P.2d 1169, vacated, 46 U.S. 312, judgment rein-
stated, 84 Wash. 2d 617, 529 P.2d 438 (1974), the Washington supreme court held 
that the compelling state interest test was the appropriate yardstick in a case chal-
lenging the use of racial criteria in law school admissions. The court considered this 
standard appropriate in view of the fact that the admissions policy was certainly not 
benign with respect to nonminorities who were displaced by it. 
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the use of racial classifioations.84 The de facto segregation cases 
present somewhat more of a problem, and are slightly further along 
the spectrum. Here, although the evidence of overt discrimination is 
not as great, the importance of the goal to be achieved is undimin-
ished, the failure of neutral remedies is well documented, and the 
adverse impact on nonminority groups remains negligible. In these 
cases, the courts have been unwilling to order, but have allowed the 
use of, benign racial classifications. 85 Slightly further along the 
spectrum are the preferential hiring cases. Here, again, there is 
usually evidence of overt discrimination, a clear interest in providing 
equal employment opportunity, and a general failure to find effective 
neutral remedies. In these cases, however, the adverse impact varies 
with industry conditions. The willingness of courts to allow or order 
the use of preferential remedies depends upon the degree of adverse 
impact they perceive. 86 Still further along the spectrum are the 
fictional seniority cases. Although discrimination in these cases may 
be more indirect, 87 the factors to be weighed here are generally the 
same as in the hiring cases, with the important difference that the 
evidence of a severe adverse impact will often be clear. It should not 
be surprising, then, that the courts generally have permitted only a 
most limited use of such remedies. 88 With this analysis as a guide, it 
is now possible to place on the spectrum a scheme designed to pro-
vide proportional representation by race. 
Because the use of racial criteria can only bei justified as a 
remedial device, 89 it is first necessary to determine whether prior 
discriminatory practices in a community have diluted the voting 
strength of minority citizens. Whether discriminatory devices 
have been used to dilute minority voting strength is a question that 
must be determined upon the facts of each case. Literacy tests, 
"grandfather" clauses, gerrymandered districts, and primaries exclud-
ing minority participation have all been used to prove dilution. 00 In 
84. See notes 48-54 supra and accompanying text. 
85. See notes 55-60 supra and accompanying text. 
86. See notes 65-74 supra and accompanying text. 
87. Overt discrimination in the seniority cases is more indirect than in the hiring 
cases because it is one step further removed from the actual discrimination alleged. 
Not only must it be shown that, "but for" discrimination, a Black applicant would 
have been hired, as is necessary in the hiring cases, but one must also find that he 
would have been hired at a particular time and would have continued to be employed 
by that employer and thereby would have gained increased seniority. 
88. See notes 75-82 supra and accompanying text. 
89. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-f6, 32 
(1970). 
90. See, e.g., Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 725 (W.D. Tex. 1972), affd. 
sub nom. White v. Regester, 412 -i;,J.S. 755 (1973); United Jewish Organizations of 
Williamsburgh v. Wilson, 510 F.2d 512, 525 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 44 
U.S.L.W. 3279 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1975) (No. 75-104); Taylor v. McKeithen, 333 F. 
Supp. 452, 456 (E.D. La. 1971), revd., 451 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1971), remanded, 401 
U.S. 191 (1972), affd., 499 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1974) (racially gerrymandered dis-
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addition, empirical studies of voting and electoral patterns may dem• 
onstrate that minority group members have been denied access to the 
political process. 91 The more pervasive the use of discriminatory 
devices intended to dilute minority voting strength, the greater is the 
likelihood that severe dilution has taken place, and, therefore, the 
greater is the need for drastic remedies, such as racial redistricting. 
Once the existence of unlawful dilution has been proved, the state 
clearly has a duty to eradicate the sources of discrimination92 by at 
least requiring neutral electoral procedures and redistricting. It must 
eliminate all discriminatory devices in order to meet its constitutional 
obligation to provide equal protection of the laws. In this situation, a 
legislature or a court may also decide that the alleviation of harmful 
effects03 on minority political access caused by prior discrimination 
requires proportional representation as a remedy. In considering 
whether such a remedy would be constitutional, a court must balance 
the compelling interest in ensuring minority political access against 
the general impermissibility of racial criteria, by e:,rnminins the effec• 
tiveness of the particular remedy (proportional representation) in 
furthering that interest, the availability of "less drastic" alternatives 
that would be as effective, and the degree of adverse impact on 
nonminority groups caused by the remedy. 
It has been argued that the interest of ensuring political access 
cannot be furthered merely by requiring that district lines be drawn in 
a nondiscriminatory fashion:94 To eliminate discrimination, a state 
tricts). Cf. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 364-65 (1915) (discriminatory 
grandfather clauses held invalid). 
91. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), the Supreme Court 
reasoned that a low voting rate is relevant to voting discrimination ''for the obvious 
reason that widespread disenfranchisement must inevitably affect the number of ac· 
tual voters." 383 U.S. at 330. Remedial provisions could therefore be imposed on 
states meeting the coverage formula of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 because of the 
past use of certain tests and devices and a voting rate below fifty per cent. Similarly, 
in Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 726 n.17 (W.D. Tex.), affd. sub nom. White 
v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1972), the court based a finding of dilution in part 
upon the statistical evidence that only two Black representatives had ever served on 
the county delegation despite a l;u-ge Black population. 
92. After Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), for example, it is clear 
that the state has a constitutional duty to eliminate de jure segregation. 
93. Arguably, the effects of discrimination can be distinguished from the source 
of discrimination, leaving the state obligated only to remove the source. However, 
it is questionable whether discrimination has been eliminated when its effects remain. 
Thus, the duty to eliminate unconstitutional discrimination may extend to a duty to 
eradicate its effects as well. See Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 
(1965) (courts have duty to render a decree which will, so far as possible, eliminate 
discriminatory effects of past); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 
F.2d 836, 847 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967) (adequate redress 
of discriminatory practice calls for liquidation of the state's system of de jure segrega-
tion and the organized undoing of the effects of past segregation). See also Swann 
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971); Green v. County 
School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968). 
94. Presumably, the state could be ordered simply to ignore factors such as race, 
color, and national origin in drawing districting plans. This would leave the legisla-
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( or a court) may find it necessary to use racial criteria in order to 
provide remedies that promise "realistically to work, and . . . to work 
now."95 Thus, even if redistricting along neutral lines eliminates 
direct restraints on the exercise of the minority franchise, this remedy 
may be insufficient to correct the effects of prior dilution because 
minority voters have come to believe that the political system will 
ignore their interests. Under such circumstances, is proportional 
representation not then justified as a necessary means to ensure 
minority access to the political process by guaranteeing minority 
control over election results in a particular district? 
Although this argument has superficial appeal, it cannot with-
stand closer scrutiny. The proposed justification of ensuring access 
rests on the questionable and somewhat racist assumption that an 
individual's political interests are determined by his race and that 
racial groups will vote as a bloc. Categorizing voters into interest 
groups defined by race violates the right of people to be recognized as 
individuals with a unique combination of interests. 00 
Even assuming that individuals of the same race will have com-
mon political interests, it is not clear that the use of a proportional 
representation scheme can best ensure increased minority access to 
the political process. To begin with, the theoretical assurance that 
minority voters in a district could elect a representative is no guaran-
tee that individual voters will, in fact, exercise the franchise or 
become involved in political affairs. Furthermore, if minority voters 
vote actively as a bloc, they may be able to exert greater influence if 
their community is split into several districts rather than consolidated 
into a majorit){ in a single district. For example, if a minority 
community can be divided into three districts in which it comprises 
twenty per cent of the voting population, and if in each district the 
minority vote is necessary to the success of a candidate, then the 
minority influence may be far greater (and minority access therefore 
more likely) than if the minority vote were clumped into a single 
district in which it comprised a sixty per cent majority.97 Thus, if the 
ture completely free to exercise its political discretion and to consider neutral factors 
such as compactness, area, political persuasion, economic and social interests, his-
torical and geographic boundaries, and contiguous territory. See Mahan v. Howell, 
410 U.S. 315, 325 (1973); Ferrell v. Oklahoma ex rel. Hall, 339 F. Supp. 73, 82 
(W.D. Okla. 1972), affd., 406 U.S. 939 (1972). 
95. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968). Accord, Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 13 (1971). 
96. See generally Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1, 24 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 
386 U.S. 915 (1967); Auerbach, supra note 49, at 46. 
91. See Taylor v. McKeithen, 499 F.2d 893, 902 (5th Cir. 1974). The dispute 
over which is more beneficial is starkly illustrated in Wright v. Rockefeller, 211 F. 
Supp. 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), affd., 376 U.S. 52 (1964), where Black plaintiffs at-
tacked a plan that concentrated Black citizens in one district as unconstitutional, 211 
F. Supp. at 460-61, while Black intervenors defended it, contending that concentration 
of minority voters in a single district made them more effective, 211 F. Supp. at 464-
65. 
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goal is to ensure access to the political process by guaranteeing that 
minority voters will have a significant influence upon candidates, 
proportional representation may not only be an unnecessary means of 
achieving this goal, but may actually be less effective than other "less 
drastic" alternatives. 98 
Proponents of proportional representation as a remedy for dilu-
tion fail to recognize that, once discriminatory barriers to access have 
been removed, the problem is essentially one of encouraging minority 
voters to take part in the political process of the community. There is 
no certain correlation between the presence of majority voting 
strength in a particular district and the involvement of members of 
that majority in community politics. Rather, promoting minority 
access requires educating individuals as to their rights and opportuni-
ties and building community interest in the political process. Pro-
portional representation actually undermines the development of a 
healthy political community by official legitimization of the use of 
racial stereotypes: 
i[R]acial electoral registers have no place in a society honoring the 
Lincoln tradition "of the peole, by the people, for the people." The 
individual is important, not his race, his creed, or his color. The 
principle of equality is at war with the notion that District A must 
be represented by a Negro, as it is with the notion that District B 
must be represented by a Caucasion, District C by a Catholic, and 
so on. The racial electoral register system weights votes along 
one racial line more heavily than it does others votes. That system, 
by whatever name it is called, is a divisive force in a community, 
emphasizing differences ,between candidates and voters that are ir-
relevant in the constitutional sense. Of course race, like religion, 
plays an important role in the choices which individual voters make 
from among various candidates. But government has no business 
designing districts along racial or religious lin~. 99 
Finally, whether or not proportional representation schemes can 
promote minority access, they should be found impermissible because 
the purpose (and possible effect) of such schemes is to dilute the 
voting power of nonminority members and thereby diminish their 
constitutional right of political access. Although a candidate may, in 
fact, find it necessary to direct his campaign on cross-racial lines even 
where a scheme of proportional representation has been put into 
effect, such a plan is clearly based on the assumption that voters will 
cast their votes by race. Its purpose is to make nonminority votes 
98. Splitting minority groups into several districts where they constitute one of 
several interest groups rather than the controlling interest group is a less drastic alter-
native because under these circumstances everyone, minority group members in-
cluded, would have an equal opportunity to participate. Where the minority group 
is given a controlling majority, there is a much greater danger that the influence of 
other district residents will be minimiz.ed and that their voting strength will be uncon-
stitutionally diluted. 
99. Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 66 (1964) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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superfluous and, thus, to achieve what would ordinarily be considered 
the unconstitutional objective of diluting votes along racial lines. For 
example, the scheme challenged in United Jewish Organizations of 
Williamsburgh v. Wilson established districts with sixty-five per 
cent nonwhite majorities, on the assumption that this percentage was 
necessary to enable minority voters to dictate election results.100 If 
such a plan functions as expected, the ability of White voters to 
participate in political affairs within the districts will be severely 
restricted. This adverse impact could be particularly great because, 
while most remedial racial classifications are used for limited periods 
of time, racial redistricting is relatively permanent.101 The court in 
Wilson maintained that no impermissible dilution would result from 
racial redistricting because the plan would not create disproportionate 
non-White representation in the legislature as a whole.102 Obviously, 
the court was assuming that White voters in a racially proportioned 
district could have their. interests protected by White representatives 
elected from other districts in the state. But a legislature proportioned 
according to race in its over-all composition is no guarantee that 
individuals have had adequate access to the political process.103 Leg-
islators do not represent racial or oth~r groups, but the citizens 
residing in their district. Each individual is entitled to effective 
participation within his own district. Whatever the ultimate racial 
complexion of the legislature, an apportionment plan creates serious 
constitutional problems if it is designed to deny equal access to the 
political process to any citizen because of his or her race. Thus, 
proportional representation cases should be placed at the far end of 
the spectrum where strict scrutiny is applied to benign racial classifi-
cations. Here, the state has a duty to eliminat~ invidiously discrimi-
natory devices and a significant interest in alleviating the effects of 
past discrimination. However, the constitutionality of the use of a 
scheme of proportional representation to achieve equality of political 
access is questionable at best. Less drastic, neutral remedies are not 
only available, but may well be more effective in advancing the state's 
interest. Moreover, if the proportional representation scheme 
achieves its legislative purpose of ensuring minority groups the power 
to dictate election results, the adverse impact upon the nonminority 
100. See 510 F.2d at 526 (Frankel, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 
3279 (U.S. Nov. 11, 1975) (No. 75-104). 
101. The courts emphasize the fact that the use of racial classification is only 
a temporary expedient of limited duration. See, e.g., Southern UI. Builders Assn. v. 
Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 1972); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 330 
(8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). · 
102. See 510 F.2d at 525. 
103. The racial complexion of the legislature may be relevant to the extent that 
it provides evidence of past discrimination. For example, the fact that only two 
Black representatives ever served on the multimember delegation representing a Texas 
county with a large Black population was one of the factors cited by the Court in 
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973 ), to support a finding of dilution. 
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group will be severe.104 Clearly, if the courts have challenged the 
validity of racial classifications that cause loss of Jobs or seniority, 
equally strict scrutiny should be applied when the right to an undi-
luted vote is at stake. Thus, under the analysis of racial classifications 
used by the courts, proportional representation is neither a consti-
tutionally protected right nor a constitutionally permissibl~ remedy. 
104. Those arguing that the courts should apply a permissive standard of review 
to "benign" racial classifications essentially ignore th~ question of an adverse impact. 
See, e.g., Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Cm. L. 
REV. 723 (1974); Developments in the Law, supra note 42, at 1104-22. See also 
Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and the 
Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1975). 
